FRANK AND ELIZABETH RUSSELL TO BR, 23–26 JULY 1918
BRACERS 46929. TLS. McMaster
Proofread by K. Blackwell

23 July 1918.

No, My dear Bertie, It is not my fault that E. did not fill up the back page this time any more than it was Miss King’s fault last time. On each occasion E. had the letter in ample time, and it was pure slackness on her part. If I had looked over her shoulder it would have been done. The position about Roads to Freedom is perfectly clear, but in order to set your mind at rest I am sending you tomorrow copies of two letters from Allen and Unwin to read. I am posting 3 more novels to you today. Your quotations about Mirabeau are very entertaining, and you seem to dislike Webb as cordially as your other friend, H.G. After all you sat for many years at his feet. I suppose however it is difficult for Gamaliel himself to be a disciple. I am paying the tailor’s bill, and in future you shall have a £5 note deposited once a fortnight. It will have to begin on my dates, July 31. As however you have had altogether £13 sent in now, I think you will last till then. I did not send the chocolate. You made a jolly bad shot about the review on S. S. The article is Middleton Murray’s, and Lady O. is furious with him.

25. 7. 1918. I have had a letter from Dorian Herbert, a C.O., who wants you to get him civilian work, and have told him that you are not in a position to attend to such matters. I wrote to Cave a week ago and have had no answer; I went to see Troup on Tuesday. He was very discouraging, but I pressed him to get me a personal interview with Cave. I can see this is going to be difficult. I was talking to Haldane later, and he gave me the straight tip that this was a very unfavourable moment to get anything out of Cave — it appears that he is being hunted and abused almost as if he were a pacifist by these witch hunting anti aliens. So there it is for the moment.

Message from E. St. George has sent a little book called Shell Shock by Professor E.C. Smith and T.H. Pear, and the proceedings of the Physical Society June 15, and thought you might like to see them. I do not want to send them if you would rather not have them. Will you in your next letter say. (End of message from E.)

Message from Miss Wrinch. I have not yet had your Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, nor your stuff on Dewey, but Miss Kyle has promised to let me have them next week. I will write to you about the Intro to Phil: quam celerrine. Very many points are coming up with regard to your work on Facts, Judgments, and Propositions, which I want to put out for you if you feel inclined. One might want, I think, something beyond facts and propositions — if propositions are to be defined as symbols for judgments, as propositions as sometimes used occur in wishes, hopes, commands, fears, decisions, doubts, denials, supposings, suggestings, knowings … and from many other acts; and the occurrence of propositions in judgments does not appear any more fundamental than occurrences in other acts. The difficulty I want to put to you is this: if a proposition is always merely the symbol of a judgment — and if such a thing always has a subject term and some relation peculiar to judging, then what becomes of the similarity between one term (if propositions are genuine constituents) of a judgment and one term of a hope, a doubt, a supposing …, or between constructed terms, (if propositions are not genuine constituents)? If it, on the other hand, does not have a relation peculiar to judging in it, how can it be derived from judgings, rather than from any other kind of act? Can one not have another kind of thing neutral between judgings … and hopes, desires, etc. For then judgments will be correct (say) when propositions are true, hopes … fulfilled … and so on. Then if ϕp is an act of judging or hoping, etc. a certain fact such as ‘p is true’ will entail x(ϕp) where x will vary with ϕ. Thus if ϕ is judging, x will be correct, or if ϕ is hoping, x might be is realised. This might also make it plausible to explain the fact that judge it will rain, and hope it may rain, and doubt whether it will rain, are of slightly different form, by the difference in the ϕ. But all this is only to suggest that it might be satisfactory to make the proposition common to judgings, fearings, etc. instead of derivative from judgment alone. And, would not all stuff about differences of correspondence between judgments and facts apply equally to those between hopes, fears, … and facts … and does this not point to the desirability of introducing something common to all these acts? Whether the propositions as you used to use the term is an entity or a logical construction, is not it that which you are discussing and not something having a relation to judgments which it does not have to other acts? I put these suggestions very tentatively. I am finding the MSS most interesting and stimulating. I would like to write more to you about them. (End of Miss Wrinch’s message)

Dearest Bertie. I hope I’ve got in Miss Wrinch’s symbols all right. I’ve been freely sweating over them and getting the whole message accurately reproduced by Miss King. My love to you. I’ll be up on the 7th Aug. and appear as usual with Colette. I had tea with her yesterday and she was very cheerful again, with a prospect of work — it might be an engagement for 3 years in London — so naturally she was delighted and excited! Ever yours E. I wrote to Mrs Minturn Scott.

Friday Good heavens what stuff from Wrinch. Rinder hasn’t written. Saw Cave this afternoon — am authorised to say you shall have 6 weeks remission for work: the rest he will “think about”. How much or how little that means I’ll tell you on Wednesday but he won’t let you out in time to come home with me. I am writing with a foul pen with a noble Lord thundering agst aliens in the H of L. Till Wednesday with love

Yours affly
F.