BR TO G.F. STOUT, [APR. 1911]
BRACERS 135571. AL/MS. McMaster. B&R Hh11.02
Proofread by K. Blackwell

1, 2As regards the sense of the relation of R in judging a R b, you make a point, which had already occurred to me, but is met by a slight re-wording of the account of sense in judgment, and this re-wording is in any case necessary to my theory. There must never, so I now perceive, be any relation having sense in a complex except the relating relation of that complex; hence, in the act of judging, the sense must be confined to the judging, and must not appear in the R. But, judging being a multiple relation, its sense is not merely twofold like that of a dual relation, and the judging alone may arrange our terms in the order “Mind, a, R, b”, as opposed to “Mind, b, R, a. This has the same effect as if R had a sense in the judgment, and gives all one wants without being obnoxious to your objections.

• 1

  [document] Proofread and corrected against the original manuscript, RA3 1,190.

• 2

  [date] BR told Karen Costelloe Stephen on 18 April 1911 that he needed “Stout’s remarks on Truth” returned as he must answer Stout. The full manuscript of both Stout’s and BR’s remarks are in RA3 1,190.