BRACERS Record Detail for 80633
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BR apologizes for not answering Simon's letter sooner [!].
"Gödel's proof that in any deductive system there must be at least proposition of which the truth or falsity can not be determined from the axioms is, I think, not so upsetting to deductive systems as is sometimes supposed.
"I can not see why you think that is has any bearing on empiricism. Empirical philosophies do not start from a set of axioms. In any case, all that Gödel proves is that there are propositions which in a deductive system can be enunciated in terms of the original indefinables, but can not within the system be proved either true or false. This is in no degree surprising and was allowed for in Principia Mathematica.
"For example, in the case of the axiom of infinity, of which we said that it could only be proved or disproved by empirical evidence, it is allowed for."